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The Under-Recognition of the Significance of Social Class 
Conceptions of Education in Piketty’s Capital 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Piketty’s Capital has created enormous interest around the world, not least in educational 
circles. One reason for this may be his readiness to refer, in a book largely focused on 
economic history, to the ways that education has, and might, contribute to better and more 
equal social outcomes.  This article welcomes this, but argues that Piketty’s suggestions 
remain somewhat limited due to his adherence to a more or less distributional, rather than 
relational, approach, and it sets out to address this issue by arguing that the assumption it is 
the distribution of credentials that accounts for their contribution is mistaken. Instead, it 
advances arguments which recognize the separate contributions of the content of 
credentials, and their valorization. The main focus of the paper is thus on the different ways 
that educational credentials are realized, which, it is argued, is a major basis for the 
maintenance of educational inequality  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Piketty’s (2014) fundamental argument is that we are moving from an affluent society where 
the growth rate exceeds capital growth (g ^r) to what he terms a patrimonial society, where 
r ^ g. He traces the basis of this shift in great and impressive detail, and points to a number 
of significant consequences. Perhaps the most important of these in this context is the 
apparent consequences for education, which seem to be that its significance declines as the 
‘traditional’ vehicle and basis of its importance, its contribution to work and economic 
growth, apparently becomes less important than returns on capital. In the context of this 
special issue, while it has to be noted that this is a very narrow understanding of education 
and its wider contributions to society at large, that is not a major part of Piketty’s argument, 
so that the critical task here has to concern itself with addressing the nature of Piketty’s 
assumptions about the role of education in changed economic circumstances. 
 
However, it should be emphasized that Piketty is by no means unaware of, or ill-disposed 
towards, recognizing the significance of sociological accounts of social class; as he writes in 
Capital, ‘In the case of unequal incomes from labour, the mechanisms include the supply of 
and demand for different skills, the state of the education system, and the various rules that 
affect the operation of the labour market’ (2014, p. 243). However, there is a tendency for 
these analyses to be based on distributional rather than relational logics, a topic to be 
addressed in the first part of the paper, and for this to involve a relative neglect of issues of 
social class in particular. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence of a greater emphasis on 
‘sociological’ approaches in Piketty’s approach to these issues since the publication of 
Capital (e g, Piketty (2015). 
 
The way that I will set out to address these issues is broadly as follows. I will first argue that 
Piketty’s approach at least implicitly rests on a distributional rather than a relational logic.  In 
the following section I will argue that the contribution of education in a patrimonial society 
cannot be reduced to the dominance of finance over growth, with the implicit suggestion 
that the reduction of the importance of earned income compared with capital income 
reduces the importance of education. Here, I will argue that other forms of capital than 
  
economic, with whose maintenance and embedding education is closely associated, remain 
highly significant in maintaining class differentials. In the main sections of the paper I will 
focus particularly on the social mechanisms through which this operates, and the different 
forms they take, especially positional goods and the distinction between mystique and 
technique as a means of retaining the significance of particular class distinctions across 
changing socio-economic circumstances. This will be followed by a brief discussion of 
Laurent Thevenot’s important arguments, from a rather different perspective, about the 
different modes of valorisation of educational credentials. In the final section, I will focus 
especially on the different modes of valorization of educationally related capitals, in England 
in particular, but with references to differences in France and Germany.  
 
 
Distributional and Relational logics in Piketty’s approach 
 
A key aspect and claim of the argument being developed here is the need to focus on the 
basis of unequal outcomes of social, economic, goods of all kinds. There is little reason to 
doubt the inequality of those distributions. The arguments concern the bases of, and 
rationales for, those distributions, and their consequences for the experiences and 
outcomes for different types of social groups. 
 
It is widely agreed that it is possible to distinguish two bases of such allocations, what are 
referred to as distributional and relational paradigms. In the former, the basis of distribution 
derives from membership of particular aggregates of individuals possessing particular 
assets—of income, prestige, qualifications, etcetera (which may be all they have in 
common); rewards are distributed on the basis of these qualities. The matter at issue in 
distributional approaches is the procedures through which they are implemented, which 
create a hierarchical continuum of income and prestige. 
 
By contrast, the relational approach focuses on the relations of control and subordination 
which are established through the particular forms taken by the allocation processes. It 
points to the elements of conflict between different social groups involved in any such 
process as crucial to the outcomes of the processes. It contrasts the hierarchical system of 
income and prestige which underlies the distributional paradigm, with systems of 
oppression and privilege, which are based on conflict between social groups. 
 
In these terms, the most significant limitation on the value of Piketty’s work for 
understanding the consequences of the processes he elaborates in such impressive detail is 
the very basis of the way that he measures inequality; this is calculated on the basis of the 
fractions of national income appropriated by different percentiles of the population—hence 
the top 1%. What we see here is the essence of the basis between distributional and 
relational accounts of social justice. Measuring inequality in terms of income percentiles 
does not enable us to reveal or understand the nature of the relational bases on which it 
rests. As Robert Boyer puts it, ‘In a sense, the book combines a form of class struggle with 
centile struggle, in such a way that inequality is measured in terms of the fraction of the 
national income appropriated by the richest’ (Boyer, 2014, para 44). 
 
Erik Olin Wright (2014, 58) catches the nature and importance of this in his review of 
Piketty’s ‘Capital’.  He points to the tendency to treat ‘poverty’ as an absolute state, rather 
than reflecting on the distance between rich and poor that might be associated with it. One 
consequence of this was that the ‘The War on Poverty’ led to the creation of an office of 
economic opportunity, not an office for the reduction of inequality…(with) almost no public 
  
attention ..given to the degree of inequality of resources or conditions of life across the 
income distribution as a whole…(while) even among scholars discussions of inequalities have 
focused on social mobility and the social production of advantages and 
disadvantages…Inequality was not an importantly recognized problem’.  
 
In essence, the argument of this paper is that improving access to different forms of 
education, or to opportunities to amass more qualifications, which seems to constitute the 
basis of Piketty’s ‘education programme’, misunderstands the issue of equality through 
education as a distributional rather than a relational one, because the basis of inequalities 
does not inhere in the qualifications alone, but rather in the wider social class relations 
through which the qualifications are accessed and valorized (see Robertson and  Dale 2013). 
 
Another, crucial, approach to the issue is that advanced by Iris Marion Young (1990, 15), 
who refers to the distributional paradigm as a ‘morally proper distribution of benefits and 
burdens among society’s members’ , but which ignores the social and institutional contexts 
and structures which determine the forms taken by the distributional paradigm. 
 
Applying the relational argument to job markets as a key mechanism of distribution of a 
range of societal rewards enables us to shed some different light on the nature and 
consequences of Piketty’s approach to the forms of social capital and assets. The argument 
here is, in a nutshell, that in job markets, the rules underlying distribution are set by and for 
employers, the ‘natural’ hierarchy, with the power not just to choose particular individuals, 
but the basis on which individuals will be chosen. It could be argued that this is entirely 
rational and unobjectionable, but that would be to ignore the (at least formally) 
‘unintended’ consequences of these processes. It has clear implications for setting the basis 
on which ‘distribution’ will take place, specifying the nature of who will  be successful—in 
itself an exercise of power—irrespective of the efficiency or effectiveness of its outcomes, 
which has been described as a form of ‘private morality’ (McMahon (2012), cited in Neron, 
2014).  
 
We can usefully apply this relational argument to some of Piketty’s work on the basis of 
unequal returns to particular forms of labour (or leisure). In this case, he does seem to adopt 
a more relational argument, in that he links the growing income differentials in society to 
the hugely influential politics of (especially executive) compensation. As Neron puts it, 
‘current compensation practices transform already allegedly problematic unequal relations, 
where some actors have unequal packages of power and authority, into even more 
problematic ones….large distributional inequalities and pay both emerge from and 
exacerbate(1) disparities in power and authority: (2) class conflict; and (3) unwelcome 
attitudes such as arrogance and disrespect’ (ibid)’ (2014, 7). And crucially for the argument 
here, Piketty also  sees this emerging from the bases on which this inequality is constructed 
and implemented. Essentially, he employs variations of Iris Marion Young’s ‘basic structure’ 
argument, which points to the taken for granted nature of the institutional rules and 
practices through which various social goods are distributed. It takes place through different 
forms of the basic structure within business—‘normal administrative relations’ (Neron, 6); 
‘organisational regimes’ (8), etcetera where, Piketty argues, “managerial energies have been 
diverted to increasing executive remuneration at the expense of growth and employment” 
(Piketty 2013, quoted in Neron op cit, 7). 
 
The key significance of these claims for the main argument of this paper is that the foci and 
consequences of the arbitrariness of the basic structures, organizational regimes, and 
‘normal administrative relations’ through which executive rewards are determined, are not 
  
confined to executive pay. Rather, they apply also to the classifications of individuals within 
organisations, or, in our case, aspiring to become members of organisations. The basic 
structures of recruitment to elite positions are informed by and based on perceptions of 
race, gender, class, social capital and especially in this context, educational background, and 
the relative suitability of individuals possessing particular combinations of those elements. 
 
 
Modes of Valorisation 
 
The core of my argument will be that not only does the meritocratic/distributional argument 
not hold, but that a more plausible account of the sources and maintenance of inequalities 
can be provided by a more relational argument that sees not a ‘liberal’ meritocracy, based 
on the possession of educational credentials, holding these inequalities in place, but a class-
based system of valorization of those qualifications as the basis for the distribution of 
rewards for educational achievements.  
 
Given that the question of valorization is central to my analysis, it may be worth spelling it 
out a little more fully here. The concept of valorization is based on the idea  that the mere 
acquisition and possession of  various kinds of credentials, skills, knowledges, experiences, 
qualifications, expertise, etcetera that underpin meritocratic extremism, is insufficient in 
itself to explain the deeply stratifying processes and consequent  outcomes (as opposed to 
the outputs) of education.  
 
Explaining those processes and outcomes involves examining the multiple and various---
class-based—ways that these qualities are recognized and valorized, but this by no means 
ignores the brute fact that wealth is in itself an extremely powerful means of valorizing 
qualifications ---as we see from the way that ‘economic capital tends to be used more and 
more as a way of assuring resources in the forms of cultural capital (by means of enabling 
entry to elite institutions) which can then be transformed into hard cash’ Spire (2015) (all 
translations from French are by RD). Hence, my focus is on the ways that credentials are 
valorized, and how, how far and on what bases their recipients are able to benefit from 
them, because the main mechanisms of, and modalities of, valorization of degrees are 
imbued by the same, class-, gender- and ethnicity-based, reasons as they were at the point 
of entry into higher education. 
 
 
However, the processes and purposes of valorisation of degrees are by no means 
homogeneous. First, while valorization has been seen as mainly to be achieved through 
levels of success in the labour market, and associated social mobility, this is by no means 
necessarily or always the case. There are two, complementary, reasons for the emphasis on 
employment success being trumpeted as the key criterion of success via graduate 
qualifications. One can be seen in the shifts in the discourses of widening participation, from 
an emphasis on improving the distribution of opportunities for social mobility through 
education, to the increasing emphasis on the discourse of the need for education as the 
means for the production of more skilled labour power to contribute to economic 
development, that is to say, a shift from equality to instrumentality as the rationale for 
widening participation. The other is the persistence, albeit implicitly, of a ‘deficit’ discourse, 
where responsibility for the effective valorization of their degree qualifications is the 
responsibility of the individuals themselves, irrespective of the existing social distribution of 
opportunity. 
 
  
As noted above, Piketty rails somewhat at the idea of meritocratic extremism. However,  it is 
not just the designation of deserving losers but deserving winners that is central to 
meritocratic  extremism, the claim—implicit in the term ‘MERITocratic’---that the 
‘winningness’ of the ‘winners’ is deserved, merited. However, Piketty’s designation of the 
marginal productivity argument as an ideological illusion does not offer an explanation of 
the actual processes at work, which  are better explained by emphasizing the centrality of 
the valorisation of qualifications over their mere possession.  
 
So, the question becomes ’if the justification of income differentials on the basis of 
‘rationally-based merit’--meritocracy—does not hold water, where do we look for the 
explanation? The argument advanced here is that it is not in the acquisition and possession 
of various kinds of credentials skills, knowledges, experiences, qualifications, expertise, 
etcetera -- that the eventual winningness inheres, but in the ways that these qualities are 
recognized and valorized, not forgetting that wealth is a powerful means of valorizing 
qualifications in itself. 
 
I will seek to undermine these meritocratic claims in two ways. The first approaches the 
issue on the basis of a ‘positional goods’ argument, while the second will elaborate this 
critique further through a discussion of the distinction between ‘technique’ and ‘mystique’ 
as the basis of the deployment and valorisation of particular forms of capital. 
 
Positional Goods 
 
These are most simply defined as goods whose benefits are directly related to their 
scarcity—in the usual example, if everyone had a PhD it would not be worth having one. As 
Brighouse and Swift put it, “…positional goods are valued as means to other goods, and their 
value as a means to the achievement of those goods is determined not by how much one 
has absolutely, but how much one has relative to others…(so that) insofar as goods are 
positional, relative amount determines absolute value…(while) the mere fact that some have 
more worsens the absolute position of those who have less… (and this) inequality of 
distribution has adverse effects on those who have less for reasons that are independent of 
any comparative advantage that they bestow, such as forms of material well-being’ any 
good, the positional distribution of which affects people’s chances of succeeding in the 
competition for other goods is properly conceived of as having a comparatively positional 
aspect…”(Brighouse and Swift 2006, 475, 477). What this also entails is that losing is 
legitimated and made credible, rather than the outcome of forms of bad luck. 
 
One consequence of this is that the assumptions of fair  distribution of opportunity that 
underpin the distributional paradigm are being very seriously undermined, for by definition 
the forms of advantage that produce success in positional competition are by no means 
fairly distributed. This may have been mitigated by forms of credential inflation, but there 
are clear limits to how far this might be effective in reinforcing ideas of fair distribution, for 
two reasons. One is that the value of the credential tends to be directly related to where it 
was earned, which is, of course, as Piketty notes in his comments on the relative wealth of 
the parents of students at Harvard and Sciences Po, directly related to levels of wealth. 
Second, and most importantly for the argument of this paper, various forms of what we 
might call patrimonial capital distort and undermine the assumed distributional effects of 
education systems on life chances.  
 
The under-recognition of the significance of social class conceptions of education in Piketty’s 
Capital 
  
  
In the terms we are using here, the greater the positionality of any given good the more 
effectively and profitably it increases the valorization of the credential. But it is crucial to 
recognize there that positional goods are not in the case of valorizing educational 
credentials confined to the quality or even the rarity of the credential itself but include 
other, non-directly educational, qualities and attributes. This is, of course, well recognized in 
the cases of gender and ethnicity, but the argument here is that the most powerful forms of 
positional benefit are those that are not necessarily recognized as such, and that even where 
they are recognised, they are especially impenetrable to emulation. 
 
One particularly significant form of positional good in the valorization of credentials is 
rooted in the distinction made by Stephen Marglin (and originally by Marx) between labour 
power and labour. Marglin points out that what the labourer sells is not a definite amount of 
corn delivered to the capitalist’s barn, but a quantity of time spent in the capitalist’s field. 
The consequence of this is that capitalist is left with the problem of transferring the worker’s 
labour into corn. Nor is the capitalist in general free to make the most productive use 
possible of the time he has purchased. ‘The length of the working day, its intensity, the 
organization of work—i e, the system of production—remain objects of struggle’ (Marglin, 
1991, 18),  
 
What is of note here is that the problem of converting labour power into labour always 
takes place under particular conditions, and always comes at a particular kind of price—
beyond wages alone—to the employer. What is of interest from our point of view is how the 
employees’ credentials are valorized, and what this means for the (potential) employee as 
well as for the employer. From the point of view of the employer, the more of the skills, 
competences and qualities the potential employee possesses before entering a particular 
occupation, the less s/he will have to spend on additional ‘training’, ‘preparation’ or 
acclimatisation. From the point of view of the job applicant, in a buyer’s market for those 
skills, competences and qualities—i.e. where the number of ‘qualified applicants exceeds 
the number of positions available--the ‘mere’ possession of the relevant skills, competences 
and qualities, is insufficient; more is needed to fully valorise them. And the argument here is 
that that ‘more’ is to be found in those ‘credentials’ which rest and rely upon what we will 
refer to as ‘mystique’ rather than ‘technique’. 
 
 
Mystique and Technique 
 
One crucial aspect of the modalities we have described and discussed is that not only are all 
those seeking greater valorization of their qualifications not necessarily aware of many of 
them, or able to acknowledge  them as available and accessible, but that it is also often 
difficult to recognize them, and more so to emulate them. Consequently, what might be put 
down to personal shortcomings, or bad luck, or to ‘who you know’ in many cases inheres in 
the difficulty of recognizing them; and beyond that, when they are recognized, of being able 
easily to see how they might be emulated. This is because the capacities to both recognise 
and emulate these modalities in essence rest on, and  reflect, what we might refer to as 
‘codes’, or habitus, that are deeply class based, to the point where they cannot easily be 
emulated even if they are recognized.  
 
There are two major reasons for this. The first is that their basis and forms may not be 
known, so much as experienced; they may be recognized but that does not mean that they 
are understood. A good example of this is patterns of speech. We only become aware that 
  
language can be, and is, used, in ways that differ from the ways that we are accustomed to, 
for instance when we recognize that other people use words that we do not, and pronounce 
common words in different ways. The crucial point is, though, that not all patterns of speech 
are equally socially approved. As we learn that there are differences in the ways we speak 
and the words we use, we also come to recognize they carry different levels of social 
prestige; some are ‘better’ than others, not in terms of clarity of expression but in the social 
status that they indicate and convey.  
 
The best known work on this topic is Bernstein’s distinction between what he called the 
language ‘codes’ followed by working class and middle class children, which he referred to 
as restricted and elaborated respectively. Very broadly, he put this difference down to the 
conditions of life that the two groups experienced.; (a) “…speech system is taken as a 
consequence of the form of the social relationship, or, put more generally, is a quality of the 
social structure…. every time the child speaks or listens, the social structure of which he is 
part is reinforced and his social identity is constrained. The social structure becomes for the 
developing child his psychological reality by the shaping of his acts of speech. Children who 
have access to different speech systems or linguistic codes, by virtue of their position in the 
class structure, may adopt quite different intellectual and social procedures which may be 
only tenuously related to their purely psychological abilities (Bernstein 1964, 56-7). 
 
 Working class children grew up in relatively ‘close’ communities, with many shared 
meanings and understandings. Middle class children, by contrast, were more likely to be 
exposed to wider ranges of language use. The consequence of this for Bernstein was that 
there was less need for working class children to spell out meanings of things and events 
that were known to be shared; this is reflected, for instance, in their much greater use of 
pronouns than nouns than the middle class children, who could not assume such a common 
context.   
 
Three points of interest here emerge from this. First, typically, the different social class 
groups do not realize how and with what consequences their speech patterns are different 
from the others; second, the differences enabled middle class children to make better 
progress at school, because their pattern of language was much closer to that of the formal 
language used in education; and, third, deriving from this, that they became related to 
differences of social standing and opportunity. 
 
A further reason is much less obvious, but as a result, much more powerful. The differences 
we have seen in patterns of speech—and habitus—have distinct and significant educational 
and social consequences. They inhere in patterns of behavior and modes of understanding 
that include, but stretch far beyond, language codes and accents. In essence, such codes 
contribute very powerfully to the maintenance of class privilege in the UK. And what makes 
them so powerful is their relative impenetrability and irreplicability. One major reason for 
this is that these codes underpin different modalities of expression and explanation, and 
that a major feature of these modalities is that they can be recognized but not easily 
penetrated. So, although accent is a very important identifier of social class difference, it is 
not in itself the basis of the social consequences or mutual 
misunderstandings/misrecognitions generated by the different codes. Rather, these 
differences are themselves very difficult to apprehend, because the codes generate, and rest 
on, modalities based on what we will call mystique rather than technique, where the latter 
makes the differences evident and potentially imitable, but the former occludes them, and 
makes them extremely difficult to decipher. That means that although differences between 
them may be more or less easily recognised, and the bases of their workings experienced by 
  
the (possibly unselfconscious) members of different social groups, it is much more difficult 
to for them be learned or copied. As Skeggs puts it, drawing on the work of Ardati on the 
development of manners, ‘the most important thing is not to learn the manners of the elite, 
but to master the logic instructing their manners’ (2004, 136). It may be possible to 
recognize that there are rules, and possibly to know them, but not to know the nature of 
what unifies them and what they collectively constitute. These remain hidden and tacit, and 
attempts to produce facsimiles merely reveal the extent of the distance between the 
insiders and the outsiders. However accurate the facsimile of parts of the ‘code’, it does not 
stand up against the whole body of which it is part. And the key part of this for the argument 
here is that such codes are class-based, which means that they are not all of equal social 
value. In particular, codes of ‘manners’ acquired in British public (i e, extremely expensive 
private) schools, and often perpetuated in Oxford and Cambridge universities, are a major 
source of the impenetrability of inequality in Britain. 
 
 
The Relationship between Sources and Forms of Capital and Entry to Elite Occupations in 
England 
 
In this section, we move to consider work on the nature and consequences of such 
differences. We are very fortunate that over the past two years there has been a major 
outpouring of work on the relationship between social class and the likelihood of entry into 
elite occupations in England, which we may see as a crucial test of the hypotheses on which 
this paper is based, that access to the most desirable occupational positions is determined 
not on the basis of a meritocratically-based distribution, but on relationally-based forms of 
social inequality.  
 
The first study we will consider ‘Non-educational Barriers to the Elite Professions’ was 
carried out on behalf of the UK Government’s Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 
(Ashley et al, 2014). The report focused on the barriers to entry to elite law and accountancy 
firms, and its overall finding was that those firms “…continue to be heavily dominated at 
entry level by people from more privileged social backgrounds  (and that) this can be 
attributed primarily  to a tendency to recruit the majority of new entrants from a narrow 
group of elite universities, where students are more likely to have attended selective or fee-
paying schools, and/or to come from relatively affluent backgrounds” (ibid: 6). 
 
The report traces the experiences of two groups of would-be lawyers and accountants 
through the whole recruitment process and beyond, and it finds significant class-based non-
educational obstacles at all stages of the recruitment process. The process starts with 
around  50% of applicants—who would go on to receive between 60 and 70% of all job 
offers-- having graduated from the ‘Russell Group’1 of elite universities, as a direct result of 
firms’ attraction and recruitment strategies (p. 9). And such screening processes—which 
may be justified on the ‘cost effectiveness’ of  concentrating mainly on sources that they 
know and trust--  continue throughout the whole process, with around 50% of RG graduates 
screened out at pre-selection, compared with around 75% of non-RG graduates. One 
significant mechanism at work here is the expectation that students will seek their first 
vacation placement in an elite firm (a source from which many elite firms hire 50% or more 
of their trainees (p.30) in their first year, which may be easier for RG graduates due to their 
access to relevant social networks (to say nothing of the costs attached to such schemes..  
There is no space here to go through all the similar skewed recruitment mechanisms, but the 
report summarises as ‘systematically disadvantage(ing) people from less privileged 
                                                        
1 The Russell Group is a self-selected association of 24 prestigious UK public research universities. 
  
backgrounds’ though it does emphasise that this is ‘rarely deliberate’ (p.41)—which we 
might take as reinforcing our arguments about mystique and technique, and the need for 
particular forms of positional goods.  
 
One further significant point to be made further embeds the ‘mystique’ argument. It 
concerns the prominence of the concept of ‘talent’2, which is ‘explicitly defined in the case 
study firms in relation to aptitudes such as resilience, determination, persuasiveness and 
drive, (while) ’confidence is particularly important’ (p.39). Another word frequently used 
here was ‘polish’, which applied less to speech and accent than it may have earlier, but ‘is 
used to characterize aspirant professionals who could display all the (desirable) traits, 
including confidence and strong communication skills’ (p.40). Overall, ‘there was widespread 
acknowledgement among the research participants that many of these features which signal 
‘talent’ are more likely to be possessed by individuals who have been socialized into middle-
class norms’ (p. 40).   
 
A different source of relevant evidence can be found in Wakeling and Savage’s (2015) study, 
‘Entry to elite positions and the stratification of higher education in Britain’. Drawing on data 
from the Great British Class Survey, they are able to identify what they refer to as an ‘elite’ 
class, composing around 6% of the population (p. 315). Of most relevance here is their 
finding of considerable differences between the class positions of graduates and others, and 
within that, the advantages accruing to graduates from elite. Most interesting, though, for 
our purposes is that Russel Group universities themselves are highly ‘striated’, with ‘those in 
London and the South-east of England considerably out-performing those in other parts of 
the UK’, while ‘Oxford graduates are clearly advantaged over any other university, including 
Cambridge’ (p. 291). 
 
There are many more examples of the continuing story of the need to negotiate similar 
barriers at all stages of the career. For instance, Macmillan, Tyler and Vignoles (2013 
‘discount the notion that higher education levels the playing field between students of 
differing socio-economic  backgrounds’ (p.21) and speculate that the reasons  ‘beyond 
academic achievement’ for more advantaged students’ success may be ‘access to other 
forms of capital that are important for accessing top jobs (such as) ‘higher unmeasured 
human capital such as non-cognitive skills, including confidence and self-esteem that help 
individuals in interviews’ (pp. 21-2). 
 
More recent work on the formation of elites, and in particular on the experience of 
graduates who have been upwardly mobile into elite positions (Freidman and Taylor) and 
Laurison and Freidman 2015) suggests that attaining to elite jobs does not mean automatic  
membership of the elite.  The former study essentially argues that the upwardly mobile ‘are 
less likely to think success is based on meritocracy than the stable elite and more likely than 
the stable elite to think success is facilitated by forms of advantage that are socially 
reproduced’ (20). Overall, the paper gives the impression that the upwardly mobile remain 
relatively ‘socially uncomfortable’ in their positions or less ‘at home’ among the elite, and 
recognize their distance from it. Laurison and Freidman’s study (which, interestingly 
highlights the ‘Class ceiling’, by contrast with Freidman and Taylor’s ‘Glass ceiling’) show that 
the upwardly mobile also face a significant pay disadvantage within Britain’s elite 
occupations as a whole, and especially within certain professions’ (p. 24), due to ‘the 
                                                        
2 The significance of the conception of ‘talent’ in these relationships has also been highlighted in the 
work of Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder, though their focus has tended to be on the identification of 
‘talent’ in the top echelons of international businesses. See Brown and Hesketh (2004),  Brown, 
Lauder and Ashton (2011), and Brown, Lauder and Sung (2015) 
  
practices  and behaviours of the upwardly mobile themselves  ( for example, lacking the 
confidence to seek more pay), or to them suffering class discrimination, being ‘either 
consciously or unconsciously given fewer rewards in the workplace than those from more 
advantaged backgrounds’  (as) ‘those in senior positions , who are themselves 
disproportionately likely to be from stable backgrounds, may misrecognize as merit (my 
emphasis) social and cultural competencies rooted in class backgrounds similar to their own’ 
(p. 25). And they conclude, that “…in general the higher professions are significantly more 
elitist in terms of restricting access for those from working class backgrounds…(and) even 
when those from non-professional backgrounds are successful in entering many of Britain’s 
elite occupations they face a powerful ‘class ceiling’ in terms of earnings” (p. 28), a gap 
which remains after controlling for a wide range of possibly intervening variables. Together, 
all this evidence suggests that the top/elite decile/percentile are able to achieve powerful 
forms of social closure exercised through the mechanisms of control and dominance over 
definitions and performances of social class. 
 
However, it is important to extend this discussion beyond a single country, since we have 
been at pains to suggest that national differences matter, perhaps in ways different from 
those indicated by Piketty.  An excellent opportunity to do this is offered by Michael 
Hartmann’s (2000) comparison of the mechanisms (though he does not use this term) of 
class specific habitus and forms of elite reproduction in France and Germany. The overall 
conclusion to be drawn from the study is that though the forms of class reproduction, 
especially through education, followed by the two countries, differ considerably, class 
specific habitus remains decisive in the reproduction of social relations. The comparison 
between the two countries, which can be extended to include the English education system 
enables us to recognize the significance of education systems, and the ways that they are 
governed and controlled, in class reproduction. Thus while the modalities and mechanisms 
through which these differences are maintained may vary, they do not efface the realities of 
class-based difference. All three cases demonstrate the transformation of ‘economic’ capital 
into ‘institutionalised cultural capital, the exclusivity of which enables the safeguarding of 
traditionally top positions’ (p. 242). 
 
Our final, and valuable, example of varying relations between credentials and jobs comes 
from the work of the French sociologist, Laurent Thevenot, in the course of his comments on 
Piketty’s “Capital’, which focus on the on the range of modes of valorization of educational 
credentials. Although Thevenot’s proceeds from a rather different theoretical background, 
and is based largely on French conditions and experience, it does offer a further and most 
valuable window on the issues of the valorization of educational credentials more broadly 
(Thevenot 2015).  Its value lies in the fact that while it represents a different approach to the 
valorization of capitals, its overall effect is to confirm and extend the value of the approach 
suggested here. 
 
Thevenot draws attention to the breadth of Piketty’s book, compared with other 
economists, especially its openness to other social sciences, arguing that Piketty’s definition 
of capital is based on its juridical propriety, its realisation on a market and the monetary 
return on the investment it has created. He notes that Piketty has been criticised for this 
reduction, notably by those who call into account Bourdieu’s arguments around forms of 
capital. This brings into play the possibility of different forms of capital, but Thevenot’s 
intention is to deepen the concept of capital and consider how Piketty has used it. He argues 
that starting from the origins of ‘human’ and ‘intellectual’ capital, and other forms of capital 
used to evaluate different forms of inequalities, enables a shift of focus towards the 
inclusion of capital in a mode of coordination between actors, which is the condition of its 
  
valorisation (mise en valeur) and differs from one form of capital to another (70). Centrally 
for our argument here, this leads him to criticize Piketty’s reduction of forms of valorisation, 
to just one, market valorisation. He argues that the inclusion of each space of capital in the 
mode of coordination required for its valorisation leads to specifying the powers associated 
with each type of capital, their claims to legitimacy, the inequalities they cause and the 
powers they exercise. Thus, Thevenot’s argument traces three bases of Piketty’s work---the 
issues of capitals; inequalities—whether or not legitimate; and the politics of a social state, 
each of which helps shed light on the issue of the valorisation of qualifications and 
credentials. (72) 
 
Looking back over the last 50 years of work in France on inequalities, Thevenot points to 
four forms of types of capital, whose importance varies over the period.  Each one is marked 
by earlier forms of learning and investment which influence valorisation—or devalorisation. 
In the terms we are using here, these might be seen as different mechanisms of mediation 
between academic qualifications and the rewards they yield. 
 
 The first variable is ‘social origin’, based on parental occupation, a type of capital generated 
by the preceding generation. This rests on two underlying political constructions, on which 
two distinct sociologies have been constructed, what might be seen as a relational approach, 
based on what Thevenot calls a  civic aim of struggle against inequalities of social conditions, 
on which Bourdieu’s sociology rests; and what we might see as a distributional approach  
based on a liberal idea of equality of opportunities, as found in Coleman and Boudon, and 
which resurfaces in Piketty’s idea of meritocracy.  
 
The second variable, which Thevenot suggests came to prominence in the 1970s, was 
differentiated by what we have referred to as the nature of the qualification. In this case, 
this takes the form of ‘professional qualifications’, usually recognised by a diploma and 
acquired in school and further training. It extended the earlier conception of human capital 
in that it was seen from the point of view of the state and education policies directed 
towards its valorisation in production; in this process, ‘human capital’ was transformed into 
‘qualification. This version was typical of an era of state planning and is based on an 
‘industrial’ mode of justification, which assumes the creation of comparable national 
frameworks, which measured forms of manpower according to their qualifications. We 
might see this as a ‘bureaucratic’ form of the relationship between credentials and their 
valorization (p. 73).  
 
This is quite different from the third form, ‘human capital’ in the sense used by Gary Becker 
and Jacob Mincer, and the economics of education. Thevenot argues that it reached its real 
peak some time later in the form of European approaches emphasising competences and 
their activation which makes individuals responsible for their own success and is seen as the 
result of individual accumulation (p. 73). We might see the relationship between credentials 
and outcomes assumed in this model as one of ‘entrepreneurship of the self’. 
 
Thevenot suggests that his fourth variable has emerged more recently in debates about 
inequalities of treatment, associated with cultural or ethnic origin. He argues that the 
legitimacy of this measure has itself become the object of extensive discussions, and is 
implicated in positive and negative valorisations. The negative variables are not justified in 
respect of the valorisation of human capital. The positive valuations  of cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds are covered by the positive term ‘empowerment’ and rest on a liberal 
construction open to multiculturalism which valorises freely chosen individual identities. 
  
This construction, and the law associated with it –which was opened up by the EU—are at 
the basis of the calling into question of unequal and discriminatory treatment (p. 74). 
 
In asking what we might learn from this comparison of Bourdieu’s and Piketty’s concepts of 
capitals, Thevenot argues that the diversification of the cultural-variables does not merely 
add other types that should have been included in Capital. Rather, they contribute to 
evidence of the irreducible variability of the ways in which people are able to capitalise their 
endowments, and realise their capital values, in different ways which we might call modes of 
coordination, with others, themselves and their environment. He states strongly that there 
is no ‘return on investment’ without a suitable mode of coordination, which shapes a 
particular mode of valorisation. 
 
This link between the form of capital and the mode of coordination assuring its investment 
and its valorization leads us to question the use the concept of capital in making make these 
links. Piketty doesn’t do it at all; cultural capital appears only once in Capital, and there is 
only one reference to Bourdieu, even though this discussion is at the centre of the 
progressive elaboration of the ideas of ‘intellectual capital’ and ‘cultural capital’. The reasons 
for his choice are clear; because he is committed to quantification, he adopts a strict 
monetary definition, applicable to establishing a form of equivalence necessary to the 
temporal and transnational comparisons on the grand scale (p. 75). 
 
Thevenot argues that by starting from the heterogeneity of capital and of the modes of 
coordination necessary for its valorisation, Piketty’s analysis could open itself to  looking into 
the range of inequalities taken as legitimate or not, inequalities which are the intended 
target of ‘correcting’ or ‘liberating’ policies. In the same movement, the analysis could be 
extended to that of the powers of domination that lean heavily on capitals, as in Marx, but 
also Bourdieu, who sees in this extension of the definition of capital an extension of the 
analysis of power starting from the resources of symbolic domination (p. 77). 
 
Conclusion 
 
My main argument in this paper has been based on the perception that Piketty’s analyses in 
Capital of the role of education in the reproduction of patrimonial and income-based 
hierarchies are flawed by the adoption of a distributional rather than a relational paradigm. 
This is based on his adherence to what seem like meritocratic means—extension of 
educational opportunities, for instance to counter the excesses of meritocratic extremism, 
which suggests that winners win because they deserve to, and not because of the vagaries 
of the socio-political-economic situations in which they find themselves. Piketty is clearly not 
unsympathetic to more sociological approaches, but he does not recognize the mechanisms 
through which the current system works to maintain particular forms of distribution of 
scarce social goods, like educational qualifications, and the ways that they can be valorised. 
 
The main alternative to this that I have suggested is to not take educational credentials at 
face value, and to assume that, ceteris paribus (which they never are, due to the hierarchies 
of educational institutions) they will receive the rewards due to them, but to recognize that 
their different value rests on the essentially relational means through which they are 
valorized.  This requires the separation of the processes of acquiring and valorizing 
educational credentials, rather than the assumption that the latter follows the former 
automatically;  a key part of the argument I have been trying to make is that the 
qualification—and the experience of HE—is ‘not enough’; when all the direct 
comparisons of levels and values of credentials have been made, we still have a 
  
major remainder of relational differences which are not reducible to the credential 
itself. 
 
Consequently, I have sought to indicate some of the different modes of valorization of 
credentials, in particular the deeply class-based processes through which they work, and 
their potentially (further) socially stratifying consequences. I have focused on the English 
case, which may be an extreme one, but not misleadingly so, as may be seen from the 
comparisons with France and Germany 
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